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REGULATING INFORMATION FLOWS:  
STATES, PRIVATE ACTORS AND E-COMMERCE 
Henry Farrell 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 7, 2005, the World Trade Organization’s appellate body 
ruled on a dispute over  services between the United States and 
the state of Antigua and Barbuda. The US had taken various 
measures that had made it much more difficult for US citizens to 
access online gambling and betting services based on Antiguan 
territory. In particular, US authorities had sought to prevent third 
party businesses, such as banks and credit card agencies, from 
allowing financial transactions between US-based gamblers and 
Antiguan gambling websites. This led the Antiguan government to 
take an action at the World Trade Organization, claiming that US 
behaviour violated the commitments it had made to free trade in 
services.  
The details of the World Trade Organization’s final decision 
(which seemed to favour the US) are of more interest to 
international trade lawyers than to most scholars of international 
politics. However, the underlying dispute between the US and 
Antigua speaks directly to an important lacuna in our theories of 
international relations - how and when states rely on private 
actors to achieve policy goals. In pressing credit card agencies and 
banks into service as regulators of the offshore gambling industry, 
the US was using private actors as proxies to achieve international 
outcomes that it would otherwise have had difficulty in achieving. 
These actions“effectively prohibit[ed] all supply of gambling and 
betting services from Antigua to the US ” (Sanders 2004), although 
they may prove ineffective in preserving the US gambling regime 
over the longer term. 
State-private actor relationships of this kind play a key role in 
many areas of international economic regulation. States are 
increasingly willing to use private actors as proxies to achieve 
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policy goals at second hand. Moreover, the relative ability of states 
to influence private actors can have important implications for 
international and domestic political outcomes. 
In order to understand why, it is necessary first to appreciate the 
nature of the underlying problem. Briefly put, globalization, and in 
particular the rapid increase in the flows of financial resources and 
information across borders, have important consequences both for 
policy interdependence and the role of the state. The weakening of 
controls on cross-border information and resource flows is leading 
to a far greater degree of interdependence between states’ domestic 
policies than had hitherto existed (Farrell 2003a). Increasingly, one 
state’s domestic choices over how to regulate information flows 
have implications for the choices of other states. The rapid 
development of e-commerce and the Internet have led to 
international controversy in sensitive social areas such as access to 
gambling, pornography and extremist political material. Any 
individual state will find it difficult to control the materials or 
services that their citizens have access to, when other states allow 
the dissemination of these materials or services on the Internet. 
This means, as Suzanne Berger (2000) has noted, that increased 
interdependence is leading to a new politicization of the state as a 
protector of social values that are challenged by economic and 
informational flows across borders. As information flows across 
state borders increase, and as the domestic policy choices to 
regulate certain kinds of information (say, to ban pornography) are 
undermined, so we may expect increasing demands placed upon 
states, to regulate these flows and restore the status quo ante. One 
way in which states can do this is to press private actors into 
service as regulators on their behalf, in policy areas where the 
states themselves lack the tools or expertise to provide effective 
regulation (Mattli and Büthe 2005, forthcoming). In order to 
prevent undesired cross-border flows of information, states will 
often be tempted to turn, as the US did, to key private actors 
which can then police information flows on their behalf.  
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Yet even if we can describe the secular changes in underlying 
structural conditions that make states more likely to consider 
using key private actors as proxies, we still have difficulty in 
making useful predictions. When exactly will states rely on private 
actors to achieve their policy goals, and when will they employ 
other policy instruments (international treaties, bilateral 
cooperation and the like)? When will states succeed in pressing 
private actors into service, and when will they fail?  
International relations theory has trouble in answering these 
questions; it is only in the last decade or so that it has really begun 
to advance testable propositions about the role of private actors in 
the global economy. Most work to date has focused on examining 
how private actors may influence states, or how private actors 
might (or might not) be creating separate spheres of governance for 
themselves, independent of state authority. Until very recently, 
(Büthe and Mattli 2005), little sustained attention has been paid to 
the question of how and when states might seek to influence 
private actors, or work through them. 
Private actors play an especially important role in the governance 
of many aspects of e-commerce and the Internet. Legal scholars 
have engaged in a wide-ranging debate of what this means, but 
with a few exceptions (Kobrin 1998, Farrell 2003, Drezner 2004), 
there has been little effort to connect this debate to the arguments 
being conducted in parallel in political science. While the legal 
academic literature is largely oriented either towards empirics or 
towards normative questions, it provides important insights. In 
particular, some legal scholars (Benkler 2000, Zittrain 2003, 
Birnhack and Elkin-Koren 2003, Reidenberg 2005) have begun to 
ask interesting questions about the intersection between the 
formal jurisdiction of states and their ability to influence private 
actors. Even though this vein of scholarship has sought more to 
offer a nuanced description than to provide testable propositions, 
it can be developed to offer some interesting hypotheses. 
In this article, I seek to bring these two literatures - the debate on 
state-private actor relations in political science, and the literature 
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on Internet and e-commerce governance among legal scholars - 
together. I show that a creative combination of arguments from 
both literatures can provide the basics of a unified framework for 
understanding (a) when states will seek to use private actors as 
proxy regulators rather than working through other policy 
instruments, and (b) when they will be successful in pressing 
private actors to implement their preferences. By combining 
political scientists’ arguments about bargaining strength with legal 
scholars’ claims about regulatory arbitrage and “points of control,” 
I construct a basic explanatory framework. While I do not 
undertake to provide an exhaustive test of this framework in this 
article, I show that it seems to provide a good explanation for 
controversies over Internet gambling, privacy and e-commerce 
taxation. 
I note that the framework presented in this article doesn’t aspire 
to provide a complete account of state-private actor relations. It 
doesn’t examine how private actors may influence states (Sell 
2003), nor how private actors may work together with states to 
create rules (Mosley unpublished), nor yet the circumstances 
under which states may press for the creation of private regulatory 
actors where no such actors exist. Nonetheless, by adopting a 
narrower focus, it provides a set of testable predictions as to the 
circumstances under which states will or will not use private 
actors as proxy regulators. 
The first main section provides a short discussion of international 
relations debates over the relationship between states and private 
actors. The next section goes on to discuss debates among lawyers 
over Internet regulation, which provide both rich empirical 
accounts, and important theoretical insights. Then, I seek to build 
on both discussions to provide a basic framework of analysis. The 
penultimate section shows how this framework may be applied to 
various issue-areas affected by cross-border information flows. 
Finally, I discuss the implications of this argument for other areas 
of the international political economy. 
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND NON-STATE 
ACTORS 
International relations theory has historically been a profoundly 
state-centered discipline, at least in North America. Dominant 
strains of thought (most prominently realism) have argued that 
state interaction and the forces which structure it are at the core 
of international politics. Until quite recently, non-state actors 
have only been studied at the margins of the discipline. Although 
some early work (Nye and Keohane 1971, Keohane and Ooms 
1975) illustrated that a variety of non-state actors had 
consequences for international politics, it did not go beyond this 
observation to create the theoretical basis necessary for a 
sustained debate. Accordingly, serious debate about the role of 
private actors and their relationship to the state system was 
usually conducted by international relations scholars who self-
consciously disassociated themselves from the North American 
mainstream.  
This was not true of comparative political economy, where 
scholars of Western Europe began in the late 1970’s to study how 
states not only were influenced by interest groups but could use 
corporatist institutions to co-opt these interest groups so as to 
achieve economic stability (Schmitter 1979, 1981, Rhodes 2002).  
A thriving literature in German (the Steuerung approach) sought 
to build more generalizable theories about the conditions under 
which states could influence private actors (Lütz 2003). However, 
this literature had little impact on debates within international 
relations. Scholars of corporatism found that it was difficult to 
reproduce corporatist style institutions at the international level, 
even in institutionally thick settings such as the European Union 
(Streeck and Schmitter 1991, Crouch and Menon 1997). Similarly, 
scholars of Steuerung concluded that it had no proper analogy in 
the international sphere, where there was no overarching state 
authority (Mayntz 1998).  
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Perhaps surprisingly, this literature in comparative politics has 
had little impact on debates among international relations 
theorists. The resurgence of interest in non-state actors among the 
latter (O’Neill, Balsiger and VanDeveer 2004) can be traced back to 
two, partially overlapping bodies of literature. First, 
constructivists began in the early 1990’s to argue that non-state 
actors - most particularly non-governmental organizations - played 
an important role in international politics. Much of this work 
sought specifically to undermine the existing state-centered 
perspective, by arguing that non-governmental organizations and 
other non-state actors were creating a transnational ‘civic society’ 
that transcended national boundaries, and that might eventually 
replace the traditional structures of international politics (Wapner 
1995). From this perspective, states (or, more precisely 
governments and government agencies) were only one set of actors 
among many in an increasingly complex and multilayered global 
system. Some scholars (Kobrin 1998) in this tradition implicated 
technological change in their accounts of the breakdown of 
traditional state structures. They argued that the Internet and 
other communications technologies were helping create an 
international system which in some ways resembled the old Holy 
Roman Empire, with complex, overlapping jurisdictions and 
loyalties. Others made narrower arguments about the role of 
private actors in international politics, not seeking to argue that 
they were fundamentally transforming the international system so 
much as to explore the specific ways in which they affected 
international outcomes. In particular, a group of moderate 
constructivists sought to examine the circumstances under which 
states and international institutions could be influenced by non-
state actors (Risse 1995, Keck and Sikkink 1998; see also Sell 
2003). 
Second, international relations theorists began to build on the 
work of Susan Strange (1996) and of radical approaches to 
international political economy, arguing that the increasing power 
of financial markets not only limited the policy choices that were 
open to states, but also transferred power to non-state actors in the 
financial sector and elsewhere. Marxists such as Claire Cutler 
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(2003) argued that private actors were constructing their own 
transnational systems of governance through the lex mercatoria 
and other instruments, and thus insulating themselves from 
pressures of democratic accountability. Others sought to make 
more general arguments about the increasing power of private 
actors to create transnational systems of governance, and the 
challenges that this created for traditional conceptions of 
international politics (Cutler, Haufler & Porter 1999, Hall & 
Biersteker 2002, Cutler 2003, Kahler and Lake 2003, Stone-Sweet 
2004).  
Crucially, both of these literatures emerged in contention with the 
existing, state-centric perspective. Thus, they sought explicitly or 
implicitly to deny the realist claim that non state actor activity is 
epiphenomenal, and more or less fully determined by the structure 
of interactions among states, by pointing to (a) the ways in which 
non-state actors may construct realms of interaction that are not 
under the control of states (and that might perhaps in time 
undermine the existing state system, or (b) the direct and 
measurable influence of non-state actors on state preferences and 
choices. With only isolated exceptions (Grande and Pauly 2005), 
they devoted little if any attention to the ways in which states 
might influence non-state actors. Nor, with very occasional 
exceptions (Farrell 2003a, Lehmkuhl 2003, Drezner 2004), did their 
critics seek to examine this aspect of state-private actor 
interaction. Realist theory in particular has difficulty in 
conceptualizing the circumstances under which states might want 
to work through private actors.  As a consequence, there is an 
important gap in the existing literature. We have an extensive 
literature discussing the circumstances under which private actors 
may influence states, a somewhat less extensive debate about the 
ways in which private actors may be reshaping the fundamentals 
of the Westphalian system, and a growing body of work on how 
private actors may create their own systems of governance, 
independent of states. However, we have very little work indeed 
discussing the circumstances under which states might wish to 
work through private actors in order to affect outcomes, or the 
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circumstances under which they might succeed in so doing 
(Mosley unpublished, Mattli and Büthe 2005).   
There is however, a related literature that provides some 
predictions as to the circumstances under which states will be 
successful in influencing private actors to work on their behalf, 
even if it has less to say about when they will want to work 
through private actors in the first place. This small but important 
body of work borrows from both from sanctions theory (Rodman 
1994, Shambaugh 1996) and comparative politics, examining how 
market power and domestic institutions affect the ability of states 
to influence private actors. Different modes of state-private actor 
interaction are not only likely to be associated with differences in 
the domestic political economy (Lütz 2003, Newman & Bach 
2004), but also with variation in international outcomes (Rodman 
1994, Shambaugh 1996, Farrell 2003b, Bach & Newman 2003, 
Mattli & Büthe 2004). Kenneth Rodman (1994) argues that the 
power of both political authorities and non governmental 
organizations to make multinational corporations disengage from 
South Africa was limited, because they could offer only 
inducements, not commands. George Shambaugh (1996) examines 
how the success of the US sanctions regime in inducing 
compliance in foreign firms was a function of the foreign firms’ 
dependence on US markets.  Henry Farrell (2003b) argues that 
differences in EU and US domestic regimes explain the relative 
ability of the EU and US to shape international outcomes in e-
commerce policy. David Bach and Abraham Newman (2003) seek 
to explain outcomes in the international regulation of personal 
information and financial services by looking to differences in 
domestic regulatory systems. Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe (2004) 
provide evidence that domestic institutional legacies have 
important consequences for battles over international technical 
standards. 
While these scholars work from different traditions in rational 
choice and historical institutionalism, they all emphasize some 
version of bargaining power (Knight 1992, Krasner 1991) as the key 
explanatory factor. A state’s ability to induce cooperation from a 
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private actor will depend on its ability to make credible threats or 
promises to the private actor, which will then motivate the private 
actor to behave in the desired fashion. Thus, for example, in 
Shambaugh’s account, the US government was able to induce 
foreign firms to comply with extraterritorial sanctions by making 
a credible threat to cut off access to US markets for non-complying 
firms. Where the US did not have bargaining leverage of this kind, 
it had little success in inducing compliance. Shambaugh, like 
Drezner (2004) and others, argues that the key determinant of state 
bargaining power vis-à-vis private actors is the size and 
importance of a state’s internal market. However, this misses out 
on the role of institutions as a crucial intervening variable – states 
will not be able to use market size as leverage unless they have 
appropriate regulatory instruments available to them (Newman 
and Posner 2005).  As Edgar Grande and Louis Pauly (2005) argue, 
the domestic institutional capacities of states are a key component 
of their bargaining power. 
Other scholars have sought to incorporate institutions directly 
into their theories as a factor conditioning bargaining power.  For 
example, both Farrell and Bach and Newman seek to include 
institutions as a key variable, arguing that the two key factors 
explaining a state’s bargaining power vis-a-vis a particular private 
actor are (a) whether the state has effective jurisdiction over an 
important asset of the private actor, and (b) whether or not the 
institutional framework within the state provides it with policy 
instruments that allow it to make credible threats or promises 
with respect to this asset. Ceteris paribus, when a state has both 
effective jurisdiction and the means to make credible threats, it 
will be in a strong position to press the private actor in question to 
conform to its preferences. 
Thus, in conclusion, there is an important gap in our 
understanding of international politics; remarkably little work has 
been done on the circumstances under which states might wish to 
work through private actors, rather than through other available 
means. There is a small body of work which provides an approach 
to one aspect of state-private actor relations - theorizing the 
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relative influence of states vis-a-vis specific private actors. 
However, it doesn’t provide much help in answering a broader set 
of questions. When will states choose to use their possible 
influence vis-a-vis private actors to press these actors into service 
as effective regulators? When will they choose other instruments, 
such as multilateral organizations? In order to begin to answer 
these questions, it is necessary first to discuss a second body of 
literature - legal scholars’ work on Internet governance - and then 
to integrate insights from these two literatures into a common 
framework. 
LAW AND THE INTERNET 
Debates among legal scholars over the political implications of e-
commerce and the Internet provides an important set of 
complementary insights into the changing relationship between 
states and private actors. In addition to discussing how new 
technological developments would affect specific areas of the law, 
legal academics have engaged in a far more wide reaching 
discussion of the implications of the Internet for law, politics and 
society. These debates have centered around two issues that are of 
direct relevance to political scientists - the extent to which the 
Internet and e-commerce have empowered private actors vis-a-vis 
governments, and the extent to which the Internet and e-
commerce challenged basic notions of states’ territorial 
jurisdiction. 
Both debates had their beginnings with David Johnson and David 
Post’s (1996) essay on law, borders and cyberspace. Johnson and 
Post argued that cyberspace undermined the relationship between 
physical geography and online activity. As a result, it undermined 
traditional law, which relied on the existence of borders in 
physical space. Events on the Internet occurred both everywhere 
and nowhere, so that no one government had any more right than 
any other to subject actions to its law. Johnson and Post argued 
that cyberspace should be considered to be its own space, 
independent of existing geographic territories, and that 
independent self-regulatory structures should be allowed to govern 
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it, and to provide its “law.” Johnson and Post’s prescriptions fit 
well with a more general enthusiasm among libertarians for the 
Internet, which they saw as potentially undermining the power of 
governments to dictate how their citizens communicated with 
each other and fostering individual freedom (Barlow 1996). In the 
much quoted (but difficult to source) words of John Gilmore, 
libertarians argued that the Internet “interprets censorship as 
damage, and routes around it.” Scholars argued too that e-
commerce would be governed not by states, but by self-regulation, 
and by the preferences of firms (Simon 2000, Spar 1998, but also 
see Spar 2001). US government decision makers claimed that self-
regulation was the best approach to most policy problems 
associated with e-commerce, and sought to encourage its 
international spread (White House 1997). 
These arguments came under sustained criticism towards the end 
of the 1990s. Lawrence Lessig (1999) argued that libertarian visions 
of cyberspace grossly underestimated the extent to which 
computer code could be used as an instrument of control. There 
was no compelling reason to believe that “open” forms of code, 
which enhanced individual freedom, would continue to 
predominate. Jack Goldsmith (2000) contended that jurisdictional 
problems were greatly overstated, and that states, far from being 
paralyzed, were willing and able to take unilateral action in order 
to achieve their policy goals. By 2003, Michael Geist (2003) felt 
safe in concluding that many of the truisms of early debates on the 
Internet had been decisively refuted; contrary to initial 
predictions, the Internet and e-commerce were increasingly 
subject to effective state regulation. 
Even if some of Johnson and Post’s arguments about self-
regulation are no longer applicable, their claim about the 
jurisdictional consequences of the Internet is still compelling. 
States continue to face pervasive problems of jurisdictional 
ambiguity in the realm of e-commerce, which traditional legal 
doctrines have difficulty in resolving (Geist 2001). In many issue 
areas, it is still an open question as to which state’s laws should 
prevail when. Indeed, the ability of states to take unilateral action 
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in order to pursue their policy goals complicates matters even 
further (Benkler 2000, Geist 2003). A state may face challenges not 
only in dealing with the behaviour of private actors (which may be 
able to relocate their activities to avoid their regulations), but the 
behaviour of other states seeking unilaterally to regulate an issue 
area according to their own principles, which may not be the 
preferred principles of the state in question (Reidenberg 2002). 
In short, even though the massive expansion of the Internet and of 
e-commerce have not substantially curtailed state power, as more 
hopeful libertarians predicted, it has had important consequences 
for states’ relationship with private actors and with each other. 
Private actors are not replacing states and creating their own forms 
of order, but they are often able to exploit jurisdictional 
ambiguities to their own advantage within the existing state 
system. As Michael Froomkin (1997) argues, the Internet presents 
private actors with new opportunities for arbitrage in many sectors 
of activity. The Internet vastly lowers the cost of trans-border 
communication, making it easier for some private actors to avoid 
undesirable forms of regulation by relocating their activities from 
one jurisdiction to another. The ability of actors to engage in such 
arbitrage will vary according to the degree to which states differ in 
their regulatory goals and capacity in a particular policy area. For 
example, Froomkin (1997) suggests that the ability of private 
actors to use regulatory arbitrage to avoid taxes will be limited 
because there are few regimes which offer strong banking secrecy 
(although see below). Further, some private actors will be better 
able than others to engage in arbitrage. Peter Swire (1998) argues 
that “mice” (small, mobile private actors) will find it far easier to 
relocate their activities than “elephants” (large actors with 
substantial, relatively immobile assets). For example, if a state 
seeks to shut down a small-scale pornography or gambling website 
which breaches its laws, the website’s owners may quickly and 
easily set up a new site in a different jurisdiction with laxer 
regulation. The same is by no means necessarily true of the 
websites of large firms with valuable corporate reputations and 
fixed assets.  
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However, states too have new means of control that they can use 
in order to discipline private actors that would otherwise escape 
their grasp. As Swire (1998) also points out, states are not limited 
to direct regulation. They can also seek to use indirect means, 
pressing Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or other actors to 
implement state policy. For example, states might require ISPs to 
block their users from having access to a particular site, or to take 
down sites with certain kinds of content from their servers. More 
generally, to adapt Jonathan Zittrain’s (2003; see as an alternative 
Birnhack and Elkin-Korin 2003) terminology, a small group of 
privileged private actors can become ‘points of control’ that states 
can then use to exert control over a much broader group of other 
private actors. This is because the former private actors control 
chokepoints in the information infrastructure or in other key 
networks of resources. They can block or control flows of data or 
of other valuable resources among a wide variety of other private 
actors. Thus, it is not always necessary for a state to exercise 
direct control over all the relevant private actors in a given issue 
area in order to be a successful regulator. If there is a private actor 
which controls a chokepoint, the state may be able to press this 
private actor into service, and transform it into a point of control. 
It can then require the private actor to regulate on its behalf, 
blocking or facilitating the flow of information or resources so as 
to control what other private actors do.  
On the one hand, states can use points of control effectively to 
recreate national borders in some issue areas. They may induce 
ISPs to regulate other private actors on their behalf and limit the 
latter’s access to goods or material which are illegal within the 
jurisdiction of the state in question, but which are accessible 
through the Internet or another means of electronic 
communications. Thus, for example, some European states require 
their domestic ISPs to block users from accessing neo-Nazi 
websites which are located in the US and elsewhere (Frydman & 
Rorive 2002, Reidenberg 2004), while the US government uses 
ISPs to regulate access to copyrighted content (Birnhack and Elkin 
Koren 2003).  
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On the other, states may be able to use points of control as a 
means of affecting what private actors located in other 
jurisdictions can or cannot do. Some key private actors 
(multinational corporations, international self-regulatory bodies) 
are able to affect what a wide variety of other private actors, across 
various jurisdictions, can or cannot do. In relevant issue areas 
where states are in disagreement, these actors’ rules and standards 
provide an effective international regulatory lowest common 
denominator (Farrell 2003b). For example, in the absence of 
international agreement on which kinds of goods can or cannot be 
sold through auction, the rules enforced by major e-commerce 
firms such as eBay or Yahoo! effectively help set the standards for 
what is allowable. If these firms forbid their users from buying or 
selling a particular kind of item, it will obviously become 
considerably more difficult for sellers of these items to find buyers, 
and buyers to find sellers. If states are successful in pressing these 
powerful private actors into service as points of control, they can 
not only recreate their borders (i.e. reassert control over actors 
within their own jurisdiction) but also assert control over private 
actors located in other jurisdictions where the powerful private 
actor holds a chokepoint. As Yochem Benkler (2000, p. 179) notes 
in a somewhat different context: 
If states can affect how all multi-jurisdictional players in 
the Internet service market structure their relationships 
to their users everywhere, then the practical reach of 
each state’s jurisdiction to increase the costs of, and 
shape the way people in other jurisdictions interact 
with, information it deems harmful - say, Nazi 
propaganda or pornography - is in fact quite extensive. 
Clearly, the extent to which states can use certain private actors 
as points of control will depend on the extent to which these 
private actors actually occupy chokepoints in the information 
infrastructure, and are able to use these chokepoints to control 
flows of information or resources. This will vary considerably from 
issue area to issue area. But in many issue areas there are private 
actors that do indeed occupy such chokepoints. These actors’ 
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ability to control what other private actors and individuals can do 
may have gaps (it is usually possible for determined and 
technologically adept users to avoid these chokepoints) but still 
serves as a reasonably effective substitute for traditional 
regulation.  
Thus, in conclusion, the work of legal scholars on the governance 
of the Internet and e-commerce provides us with a rich body of 
both empirical information and theoretical insights, from which 
we can perhaps begin to construct a more general account of state-
private interaction. It is to this task that I turn in the next section. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING STATE-PRIVATE 
ACTOR RELATIONS 
Building on the existing literatures in international relations and 
Internet law, I argue that three factors are likely to affect states’ 
desire and ability to press private actors into service as regulators 
on their behalf. First, and most obvious, is states’ need (or lack of 
same) to deal with problems of policy interdependence in a given 
issue area. Building on Froomkin’s arguments about regulatory 
arbitrage, I argue that this will depend on the degree of 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of states’ regulatory preferences and 
practices. Second, is the presence or ‘absence’ of suitable private 
actors in a given issue area. Here, I borrow from Zittrain, and from 
Birnback and Elkin-Koren, to argue that this will depend on 
whether or not there are private actors that serve as ‘points of 
control.’ Finally, building on the existing literature in 
international relations theory, I argue that states’ bargaining power 
vis-a-vis private actors will determine their ability to press 
suitable private actors into service on their behalf. 
As the introduction argues, globalization and the Internet do not 
confront states with a loss of authority so much as with a new set 
of challenges stemming from increased policy interdependence. 
Private actors are not empowered vis-a-vis states in any absolute 
sense, and are highly unlikely to take up the reins of command. 
Instead, to adapt Froomkin’s argument slightly, the increased 
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interdependence resulting from the Internet and associated 
technologies will increase private actors’ ability to engage in 
regulatory arbitrage where there are substantial differences 
between states’ regulatory systems. All other things being equal, 
small, flexible private actors, with few fixed assets, can take 
advantage of differences between regulatory systems, locating 
their activities in that state where the regulatory system is most 
congenial to them. Thus, for example, US businesses that were 
interested in making a profit from online gambling were able to 
relocate their activities to countries like Antigua, which had lax 
regulation of gambling. Similarly, private citizens located within 
the boundaries of the US could evade the regulatory power of the 
state by gambling online through services located in offshore 
locations like Antigua or Gibraltar. 
Logically, then, the degree to which private actors can engage in 
regulatory arbitrage will depend on the degree to which states’ 
regulatory preferences are similar or dissimilar. These preferences 
will be a function of previously existing domestic social bargains 
within states; as Berger (2000) suggests, states will feel obliged to 
protect these bargains against outside pressures. If all states have 
the same regulatory preferences, and are able to enforce those 
preferences reasonably well, then there is little scope for private 
actors to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Even small, flexible 
private actors will have no very strong reason to locate their 
activities in one jurisdiction rather another, besides the usual 
reasons of labour and capital costs, infrastructure etc. In contrast, 
if there are substantial differences between states’ regulatory 
preferences (or, to a lesser degree, their ability to enforce those 
preferences), private actors will have very considerable scope 
indeed for regulatory arbitrage. All other things being equal, small, 
flexible private actors will have a strong incentive to locate their 
activities in jurisdictions where the regulatory preferences of the 
state provide them with the greatest freedom to purvey their 
product. By the same token, individuals located within a 
jurisdiction which bans a particular online activity will 
themselves be able to engage in a form of arbitrage. They can use 
the Internet to transact with offshore entities that are located in 
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other jurisdictions and that provide the service in question, thus 
evading the laws of their own jurisdiction. 
Thus, the degree to which states’ regulatory preferences are similar 
or dissimilar will be a key dimension dictating state choice. One 
can draw a distinction between (a) issue areas where states have 
similar preferences, and (b) issue areas where states have dissimilar 
preferences. In the former, cross-border information technologies 
like the Internet will not provide significant arbitrage 
opportunities either for private actors who are willing to relocate 
their activities offshore, or for individuals who are seeking out 
offshore businesses providing services that are illegal in the 
individuals’ home jurisdiction. This is not to say that there will be 
no scope for arbitrage whatsoever. Even if all states have the same 
regulatory preferences, it may be more complicated for them to 
regulate cross border activities (different national enforcement 
agencies will need to coordinate with each other, share 
information etc).  Still, the scope of these arbitrage opportunities 
will be limited. In contrast, there will be far greater arbitrage 
opportunities in contexts where states’ regulatory preferences 
differ substantially. Here, we may expect ceteris paribus that 
nimble private actors can locate their activities in friendly 
jurisdictions, and that individuals can use the Internet to procure 
services that are illegal within their own jurisdiction, but not 
illegal in a different state with different preferences. 
The second key dimension that explains state choice is the 
presence or non-presence of private actors that provide “points of 
control” in a given issue area. As noted, these are a special kind of 
private actor - they occupy choke-points in the infrastructure of 
information or resource flows, and can thus potentially regulate 
the online activities of a much wider set of actors. We may 
reasonably expect that where such private actors exist, states will 
have a strong incentive to seek to press them into service as 
regulators where they can. By so doing, states can offload some of 
the costs of regulation onto a third party, and exercise substantial 
control over what a wide variety of other private actors can or 
cannot do. For example, states may use ISPs as points of control, 
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requiring them to block access to certain external websites, and to 
take down certain kinds of content from user homepages that are 
hosted on their servers. By imposing these requirements, states 
can use ISPs to control the activities of a much wider group of 
actors - the ISPs’ users - preventing them from having access to 
certain kinds of material, even if that material is located offshore. 
Thus, in issue areas where there are private actors that provide 
points of control, we may expect states to take advantage of this, 
and to press these private actors into service to regulate the 
activities of a much larger group of actors. In contrast, in issue 
areas where there are no such points of control, we may expect 
states either to use more traditional instruments of regulation 
where these are available, or not to regulate at all, where they 
aren’t. 
Mapping these two dimensions against each other provides the 
following 2x2 table, which describes the likely regulatory outcome 
for each combination of state preferences and presence or absence 
of points of control. 
Figure 1 
States’ regulatory 
preferences/points of 
control 
Points of control present Points of control 
absent 
Similar regulatory 
preferences  
Hybrid regulation (private 
actors embedded in 
international agreements) 
Traditional forms of 
regulation (domestic 
and international) 
Dissimilar regulatory 
preferences  
Recreation of borders/States 
vying for influence over 
points of control 
Stalemate 
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In figure 1, the vertical axis represents the similarity or 
dissimilarity of states’ regulatory preferences in a given issue area. 
The horizontal axis represents the presence or absence of private 
actors that might serve as points of control in that issue area. 
Where states have similar preferences, and points of control are 
present we may expect that states will opt for hybrid forms of 
regulation (Farrell 2003a). In hybrid regulation, states agree on an 
international framework that lays out the principles of 
cooperation in a given issue area - but delegate much of the 
implementation of these principles to the relevant private actors, 
which become points of control for the states in question. As with 
traditional international institutions, states may bargain over the 
specific features of the institution, and the distribution of costs 
and responsibilities associated with it. However, they will delegate 
as much as possible of the actual implementation of their 
preferences to private actors which have more extensive technical 
knowledge and are better positioned to block or redirect 
information flows. 
Where states have similar preferences over regulation, and points 
of control are absent, we are in the traditional world of 
international regulation described exhaustively by Keohane (1984) 
and other institutionalists. States will create international 
institutions where necessary to reduce transaction costs and to 
monitor compliance, perhaps distributing the burdens and benefits 
of cooperation according to the underlying bargaining power of the 
states in question (Krasner 1991).  
Where states have dissimilar preferences, and points of control are 
present, we may expect one of two outcomes. Where states are 
primarily interested in protecting their own domestic bargains, 
and have little interest in what other states do, we may expect 
them to use points of control to recreate national borders. That is, 
they will seek to use points of control to reassert authority over 
their own citizens, by regulating these citizens’ access to services 
and materials located outside their national borders. Depending on 
which private actors are pressed into service, this may have 
knock-on consequences for other states. For example, France and 
20 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 02 NO. 01 
 
 
Germany have pressed Internet auction services such as Yahoo! 
and eBay to regulate their citizens’ access to Nazi materials and 
paraphernalia (Farrell 2003b). Both Yahoo! and eBay have 
introduced policies that prevent all of their users from buying or 
selling Nazi-related materials, regardless of whether the user lives 
in France, Germany or elsewhere. Thus, France and Germany’s 
preferences have implications for the citizens of states such as the 
US, which does not forbid the sale of Nazi-related materials. This 
may potentially lead to clashes between states. The risk of 
disputes between states will be even more marked where states are 
interested not only in protecting their own social bargains, but 
also in influencing how individuals and private actors in other 
states behave. Here, we may expect to see states actively vying for 
influence over potential ‘points of control’ in a given issue area. 
Each state will seek to ensure that the points of control in a given 
issue area implement its regulatory preferences rather than the 
(clashing) preferences of another state. In the absence of any basis 
for agreement among states, the policies of key private actors may 
indeed set an effective international regulatory lowest common 
denominator, although the extent to which this is true will 
obviously vary together with the scope of influence of these 
private actors. 
Finally, where states have dissimilar and incompatible 
preferences, and points of control are absent, we may expect to see 
stalemate (Moravcsik 1997). States will be unable to reach 
agreement among themselves over international institutional 
arrangements, since they do not agree about the underlying 
principles of regulation for a given issue area. However, they will 
also be unable effectively either to rebuild national borders 
through points of control, or to use points of control to shape the 
international regulatory lowest common denominator.  
The two cells where points of control are absent receive extensive 
discussion in the existing literature. The cells where points of 
control are present are of considerably greater relevance to the 
research agenda that this article proposes. What is likely to 
determine specific outcomes in these cells? To be more precise: 
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when will states be successful in press-ganging private actors into 
their service as points of control? When states vie for influence 
with each other over potential points of control, which states are 
likely to win, and which to lose? 
In order to answer these questions, it’s necessary to return to the 
sources of state bargaining power vis-a-vis private actors. As noted, 
market size is often a poor measure of power (Newman and Posner 
2005); states may be unable to deploy market power effectively 
without appropriate regulatory structures.  While market size may 
affect a state’s bargaining power vis-a-vis a given private actor 
(ceteris paribus, states with larger internal markets are likely to 
offer greater market opportunities to such actors than states with 
smaller markets), it will only do so if the state in question is able 
selectively to grant or withdraw market access to and from private 
actors who comply or fail to comply with the state’s wishes. 
Therefore, it’s necessary to supplement an examination of market 
size with a focus on whether existing domestic rules allow a state 
to deploy, or not to deploy its market strength in a given area of 
regulation (Farrell 2003b, Bach & Newman 2004). More 
specifically, a state’s ability to bargain vis-a-vis a given private 
actor will depend (a) on the private actor’s specific exposure to the 
jurisdiction of the state (a function inter alia of market 
opportunities and the extent to which the private actor’s fixed 
assets are subject to the jurisdiction of the state), and (b) on the 
regulatory instruments through which the state can make credible 
threats or promises to the private actor in order to induce the 
private actor to implement its preferences. 
This has some interesting implications. First, we can reasonably 
expect that states as a collectivity will be in a stronger bargaining 
position vis-a-vis private actors that offer potential points of 
control where they share regulatory preferences than when they do 
not share them. Second, where states disagree over how a 
particular issue area should be regulated, some states will be better 
positioned than others to exercise influence over points of control. 
Specifically, states that not only have jurisdiction over assets 
belonging to the relevant private actors, but also have appropriate 
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policy instruments which they can use to convert that market 
power into bargaining leverage, will be better able to influence 
potential points of control than will states with small markets, or 
even states with large markets but without appropriate policy 
instruments that would allow them to make credible threats or 
promises. Thus, in issue areas where states have strongly opposed 
interests and preferences, private actors that offer potential 
“points of control” will be more likely to be influenced by those 
states that (a) have jurisdiction over their assets or provide 
substantial market opportunities for these actors, and (b) have 
policy instruments that allow them to make credible threats or 
promises with regard to these assets or opportunities.  
Thus, in summary, I suggest that we need to understand the 
interaction of three factors - the congruity (or lack of same) of state 
regulatory preferences, the presence or absence of points of 
control, and the bargaining strength of states vis-a-vis potential 
points of control, in order to explain regulatory outcomes. By 
looking at the way in which state preferences and the presence or 
absence of points of control interact, we can explain the broad 
regulatory structures that are likely to emerge in different issue 
areas. By focusing more closely on the determinants of bargaining 
strength, we can make predictions as to which states are likely to 
win and which to lose, where state preferences clash, and where 
points of control are present. 
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO E-COMMERCE 
REGULATION 
While an exhaustive test of hypotheses derived from the above 
framework is outside the scope of this article, a brief plausibility 
probe, drawing on case studies in the existing literature, may help 
establish whether the framework seems likely to provide a useful 
description of reality. First, the dispute over gambling regulation 
described in the introduction provides us with a case in which 
states clearly had conflicting preferences, but in which points of 
control (US-based financial institutions) were present. Second, the 
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dispute between the EU and US over privacy regulation (Farrell 
2003a) provides a case in which states (eventually) had compatible 
preferences, and in which there were points of control (self-
regulatory organizations). Finally, the vexed issue of e-commerce 
taxation (Paris 2003) presents an example of a policy area where 
state preferences clash, but where there are no obvious points of 
control. 
Internet gambling presents an example of an issue-area where 
states have different - and conflicting - preferences. On the one 
hand, the US federal government has typically sought to regulate 
gambling through electronic communication, and some state level 
officials have aggressively sought to shut down gambling 
operations. While Congress has failed to pass legislation that 
explicitly bans Internet gambling, the government has interpreted 
the previously-existing Wire Wager Act as forbidding it, and has 
sought to prosecute those involved. This has prompted figures 
from the US gambling industry and elsewhere to set up Internet 
gambling operations in more gambling friendly jurisdictions such 
as Antigua, which sought their main custom from US consumers. 
While US authorities were successful in prosecuting individuals 
who had maintained a US presence, and in preventing gambling 
operations from offering shares for purchase to US citizens, they 
were unable either (a) directly to prevent US citizens from 
gambling using offshore websites, or (b) to shut down these 
websites which were located outside the jurisdiction of US law. 
Nor did Antigua have any incentive to shut down gambling 
operations at the behest of the US; at one point gambling 
operations accounted for over 10% of Antigua’s GDP (Thayer 
2004).   
The solution adopted by US authorities - first at the state level in 
New York, and then at the federal level - was to attack offshore 
gambling sites indirectly, by requiring banks and other financial 
entities to block transactions. These banks and financial entities 
provided a possible point of control for US authorities; they 
occupied a chokepoint in the relationship between offshore 
gambling websites and their US-based customers. Money had to 
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flow back and forth between US-based gamblers and offshore 
gambling operations if the former were to be paid when they won 
their bets, and the latter were to make a profit. New York State 
Attorney-General Elliot Spitzer’s office began to pursue financial 
institutions aggressively, threatening Citibank with prosecution 
for profiting from illegal activity, and pressing it to make a 
substantial donation to compulsive gambler counselling services, 
and to agree to block gambling transactions in future (Manter 
2003). A similar action against the popular Internet financial 
intermediary PayPal resulted in a substantial fine. The US 
Department of Justice built on this precedent by threatening to 
prosecute any firm that provided financial services to offshore 
Internet gambling operations. These threats have resulted in the 
creation of a self-regulatory regime for financial intermediaries 
such as banks and credit card companies in which they seek to 
identify and block gambling transactions involving US citizens. 
It is unclear whether the US effort to block its citizens from 
gambling on the Internet will work over the longer term; gambling 
sites are beginning to exploit ambiguities within the US legal 
regime to promote and legitimize their activities. Nonetheless, in 
the short run it has had devastating consequences for the Antiguan 
gambling industry which has dwindled to a small fraction of its 
former size (Thayer 2004). This prompted Antigua to take an 
ultimately unsuccessful WTO action against the US, arguing, in 
the words of Antigua’s chief foreign affairs representative that the 
US enforced its prohibition on gambling by “blocking credit card 
transactions and penalising credit card companies and banks that 
facilitate them” (Sanders 2004). 
Thus, in a policy area where (a) there was substantial disagreement 
between states’ regulatory preferences, and (b) potential points of 
control in the financial industry, the US sought to stop its citizens 
from using offshore gambling operations by requiring these points 
of control to block transactions as the framework would have 
predicted. It thus had some success in recreating a national border, 
and in reasserting its authority over US citizens who wished to 
gamble using offshore websites. This had quite substantial knock-
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on consequences for another state, Antigua. Had Antigua itself had 
some leverage over the financial intermediaries involved, we 
might have expected it to seek to counter US influence at that 
level; instead, it opted to seek recourse at the WTO. 
Privacy is a highly important policy area - persistent fears among 
consumers that their privacy was threatened by new technologies 
was frequently cited as a serious problem for the expansion of e-
commerce (White House 1996). The WWW and Internet, together 
with more mundane technologies such as consumer loyalty 
programs,  permitted new kinds of information gathering, while 
advances in computing power and database programs allowed 
businesses to engage in quite sophisticated forms of ‘data mining.’ 
There was substantial agreement among advanced industrialized 
democracies over what the goals of privacy protection should be, 
at least on the level of principle. The OECD Privacy Principles 
represented a general agreement among its member states as to the 
basic principles of privacy regulation in an era of rapidly advances 
in information technology. However, there was a quite substantial 
disagreement among states as to how these principles should be 
implemented for the private sector, the US preferring self-
regulation, and European countries preferring binding legislation. 
These differences in approach led to confrontation between the 
European Union and the United States (for a more complete 
account, see Farrell 2003a). In the late 1990's, the European Union 
passed a Data Protection Directive which sought to create a 
common European framework of ‘data protection’ principles - but 
also to restrict the movement of individuals’ personal data to 
countries outside the EU which did not have “adequate” privacy 
protection. The reasoning behind this was clear. European officials 
feared that if they allowed personal data to be exported beyond the 
reach of European law, they would be giving businesses free 
license to circumvent the EU regime by exporting data, processing 
it abroad, and reaping the results at home. However, this clearly 
had adverse implications for EU trading partners which had laxer 
regimes, in particular the US, which was highly unlikely to be 
considered “adequate” by EU authorities (Swire & Litan 1998). 
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The US initially responded to the EU by making counter-threats, 
and by seeking to encourage the post-haste creation of an effective 
self-regulatory regime, through encouraging so-called “privacy seal 
organizations” to begin offering their services to firms. These 
organizations were perceived by both EU and US negotiators as 
important ‘points of control;’ the US hoped that they would 
diffuse a self-regulatory model of privacy protection 
internationally, while the EU hoped that they might allow the EU 
to ratchet up private sector standards of privacy protection within 
the US (Farrell 2003a).  
The result of this confrontation was an eventual agreement 
between the EU and US on a ‘hybrid solution,’ the so-called Safe 
Harbor Arrangement, which combined on the one hand elements 
of government oversight, and on the other a strong element of self-
regulation, delegating many aspects of implementation to privacy 
seal organizations. It is to be noted, however, that this solution did 
not emerge naturally or easily from the shared understanding of 
the EU and US regarding privacy rights (although its emergence 
was greatly facilitated by the commitments of both EU and US to 
the OECD privacy principles). Instead, it required a serious 
reconsideration by both sides of what the appropriate means 
towards privacy protection were. In other words, some basic 
elements of the final agreement were not present in the ex ante 
views of privacy shared by both sides. Instead, a greater level of 
agreement on the underlying issues of enforcement was created 
through argument that occurred in the process of negotiation itself 
(Farrell 2003a). It is quite possible that had negotiations gone 
slightly differently, the eventual solution of a hybrid regime would 
not have emerged. 
Thus, the privacy case study provides only partial support for the 
framework. On the one hand, there was some degree of existing 
consensus on the basic principles of privacy regulation, which 
helped facilitate the creation of a hybrid regime combining an 
international agreement with points of control. But on the other, 
final agreement on this regime was only possible because of a 
process of argument and persuasion, which could have gone quite 
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differently. Thus, while the arguments advanced in the simple 
framework above help to explain the empirical outcome, they 
clearly don’t provide a complete account of the circumstances 
leading up to it. 
Finally, the rapid expansion of e-commerce poses a substantial 
long-term challenge to states’ ability to raise taxes. As Roland 
Paris notes (the following account relies extensively on Paris 
2003), the current international taxation regime faces extreme 
difficulties in accommodating e-commerce transactions. Typically, 
states collect direct taxes on the basis of source (they seek to 
collect taxes from those who have sources of income located in 
their jurisdiction), residence (they seek to collect taxes on the 
income of residents of their jurisdiction, regardless of whether 
these residents’ sources of income are elsewhere) or both. A 
complicated international tax regime has been created, which 
seeks to avoid “double taxation” of individuals and economic 
actors, in part by using the principle of ‘permanent establishment’ 
(whether a business has a physical presence in a country) to 
determine the geographic location of sources of income and of 
individuals’ residency. 
This, however, is extremely hard to do with regard to e-commerce 
transactions. Johnson and Post’s logic applies with a vengeance; 
when an e-commerce transaction takes place across multiple 
jurisdictions, as many do, it is difficult to determine which 
jurisdiction(s) should be able to tax it. It is possible for a firm to do 
a substantial amount of business in a particular jurisdiction, 
without having any permanent physical presence in that 
jurisdiction that would give rise to a tax liability. Multinational 
firms have always been able to engage in some degree of transfer 
pricing to lower their tax burden. However, the advent of e-
commerce and of business based on cross-border information 
transfer radically increases the opportunity of firms to engage in 
this form of regulatory arbitrage; the business consultancy firm, 
Ernst and Young, recommends that their clients take advantage of 
the Internet to locate geographically neutral services in low-tax 
jurisdictions (Paris 2003).  
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This poses a quite serious challenge to states’ abilities to raise 
revenues through direct taxation (and to a lesser extent through 
indirect taxation too). There are no reliable statistics on the size of 
the international e-commerce sector, but there is general 
consensus that it is important, and growing. States - and especially 
high taxation states - are likely to suffer increasingly large revenue 
losses as the e-commerce sector expands. However, there are few 
obvious solutions. In contrast to many other policy areas affected 
by e-commerce, there are no obvious third parties that might serve 
as points of control. Furthermore, it is difficult for states to 
coordinate action among each other. Taxation is a notoriously 
sensitive topic for states. As the OECD’s Technical Advisory 
Group on the topic notes: 
The fact is ... that recourse to international exchanges of 
information and assistance in collection for purposes of 
taxing business profits is still the exception rather than 
the rule, especially for developing countries (p.18, 
OECD 2003). 
The problem is that states seeking to tax business profits are 
unlikely to reach agreement; each wants to maximize its own tax 
revenues. More generally, the question of whether to reform the 
tax regime in order to better tackle the problems of e-commerce 
has strong and obvious distributional implications. States with 
low taxes on business profits are likely to prefer the status quo, as 
it means that international corporations are more likely to engage 
in transfer pricing arrangements that increase their revenues, and 
mobile actors are more likely to base themselves in these 
jurisdictions. States with high taxes on business profits equally 
clearly have the opposite incentive, and are likely to want reform. 
Roland Paris (2003) argues that states nonetheless face a collective 
problem over the longer term which makes cooperation a 
functional imperative. Because e-commerce is likely to continue 
expanding in importance, and because the current regime is so 
poorly suited to capturing taxes from e-commerce (so that in 
principle some businesses may be able to avoid taxation 
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altogether) states will probably have to move taxation to the 
international level, creating a new regime in which there would be 
considerably higher levels of coordination and collaboration. In the 
long run, Paris may quite possibly be right, especially if the 
problems of e-commerce present a major fiscal challenge to 
powerful states such as the US and EU member states. However, 
there is little evidence at the moment of any great appetite among 
states to move in this direction, and considerable evidence of 
dissension. In the words of the OECD Technical Advisory Group: 
Most countries would probably evaluate any suggestion 
to change the current treaty norms on the basis of their 
current domestic law and the impact that this would 
have on their tax revenues. On that basis, it is likely 
that the process of reaching an international agreement 
concerning new rules for taxing business profits would 
be long and difficult (p.26, OECD 2003). 
Thus, the taxation of e-commerce presents an example of an issue 
area where states have conflicting preferences over whether and 
how the current regime should be reformed, and no obvious points 
of control through which states could reassert authority over the 
relevant private actors. As the framework would predict, the result 
is stalemate, and a continued inability to reach a mutually 
agreeable modus vivendi, as the combination of increasing 
interdependence and variation between states’ taxation policies 
offers substantial arbitration opportunities for private actors. 
In conclusion then, a limited plausibility probe, drawing on three 
prominent cases in the recent literature, suggests that the 
explanatory framework set out in the previous section has some 
real explanatory value. As the case of privacy regulation 
illustrates, it has some limitations. Nonetheless, this framework, 
simple though it is, appears on the basis of an initial test of 
plausibility to offer a highly useful account of state choice in a 
world where they can work through private actors. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, I’ve argued that there’s an important gap in our 
current understanding of the relationship between states and 
private actors. While we have a substantial body of knowledge on 
the circumstances under which private actors can, or cannot 
influence states, and we have some hypotheses about the 
circumstances under which they can create their own spaces of 
transnational governance, we know very little indeed about the 
circumstances under which states are likely to wish to work 
through private actors in order to achieve policy outcomes. In part, 
this is a function of the way that the international relations debate 
has developed; both those who privilege states and those who 
privilege private actors as the key actors in international relations 
have tended not to be interested in this relationship because of 
their underlying theoretical commitments. It is also the result of 
the way in which more recent debates on globalization tend to 
focus on very broad and general claims about secular changes (or 
the lack of same) in the relationship between states and private 
actors in world politics, neglecting inquiry into their specific 
micro-relationships (Kahler and Lake 2003). 
More precisely, I set out to provide a more specific understanding 
of the circumstances under which states will seek to work through 
private actors, building upon an important new body of work on 
states’ bargaining strength vis-a-vis private actors. I seek to 
integrate arguments from a rich body of legal-theoretical literature 
on the evolution of the Internet and e-commerce. This literature 
not only provides a very useful body of empirical information, but 
also important theoretical insights. I show that arguments about 
state preferences and regulatory arbitrage on the one hand, and the 
presence of private actors that offer ‘points of control’ on the 
other, can be brought together into a unified framework that 
provides predictions as to the kinds of outcomes we may expect in 
different areas of policy. I then conduct a “plausibility probe,” by 
examining three cases from the existing literature, and find that 
they offer good support for the plausibility of the framework. 
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E-commerce and the Internet offer an especially rich testing-
ground for arguments about state-private actor relations. However 
if the claims advanced in this article have merit, they can be 
expected to have explanatory power in other important areas of 
state-private actor interaction in the international economy, such 
as financial regulation (Goodman & Pauly 1993, Mosley 
unpublished) and standard setting (Mattli and Büthe 2003). Testing 
these claims - and those of rival frameworks of explanation - 
constitutes an important future research agenda for international 
relations. 
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